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Notes
COLORADO v. CONNELLY: THE DEMISE OF FREE WILL AS AN
INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR FINDING A CONFESSION
INVOLUNTARY
I.

INTRODUCTION

An incompetent paranoid schizophrenic is interrogated by the police and eventually confesses to the crime of armed robbery. The confession is found to be involuntary and is excluded from evidence on due
process grounds.' Why? Is it because the confessor lacked "free will?"
Or is it because the police overstepped societal bounds in the tactics
used to obtain the confession? Or is it a combination of factors that
mandate that the confession be excluded?
The Supreme Court of the United States has long grappled with the
questions involved in excluding the confession of a criminal defendant
on due process grounds. The ongoing evolvement of confessions law in
the Supreme Court and other forums reflects the different and competing values inherent in a court's determination that a confession is or is
not voluntary for due process purposes. 2 Such a determination necessarily involves a judgment of the extent to which the court is competent
to assess and reconcile these values. The question becomes: what factors may a court consider in deciding whether a confession is involuntary for due process purposes?
The Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Connelly 3 answered this
question to a considerable extent. The Court held that in making the
constitutional voluntariness determination, a court should not solely
consider a defendant's mental condition. 4 Connelly was the first Supreme
Court case in the area of involuntary confessions that did not involve
allegations of the use of coercive tactics by the police in obtaining the
1. This is the factual situation presented in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960). For a further discussion of Blackburn and the ambiguity of the
Court's reasoning in that case, see infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
2. For a detailed history and analysis of all aspects of confessions law from
the English common law until 1964, see Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79
HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966) [hereinafter Developments]. For an analysis and history
up until the present date, see D. NISSMAN, E. HAGEN & P. BROOKS, LAW OF CONFESSIONS (1985) [hereinafter LAW OF CONFESSIONS]. For a further discussion of
the line of cases which address the question of the "voluntariness" determination, see infra notes 14-59 and accompanying text.
3. 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986). For a discussion of the facts of Connelly, see infra
notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 520.
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Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [1988], Art. 5

896

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 895

confession. 5 There was, however, subsequent evidence that the respondent, Francis Connelly, was insane when he walked up to a Denver police officer and admitted, without prompting, that he had killed a young
girl.6 In attempting to suppress the confession at trial, Connelly
claimed that his mental condition deprived him of free will, that his confession was thus involuntary and that its admission into evidence would
deprive him of due process. 7 The concept of "free will" forms the core
of the majority/dissent debate in Connelly. 8 Earlier Supreme Court cases
suggested that an absence of police overreaching was not necessarily
dispositive on the question of involuntariness if the circumstances suggested that the confessor otherwise lacked free will. 9 Connelly established, however, that without police coercion a confession cannot be
involuntary for due process purposes.10 The Connelly Court also held
that without police coercion an attempted Miranda waiver of fifth
amendment rights cannot be involuntary. 1 ' Finally, the Court held that
in a hearing to determine the validity of a Miranda waiver the govern12
ment need only prove waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.
While Connelly definitively answered some formerly open questions
in confessions law, the decision may prove to erode the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.1 3 This Note will analyze the Connelly decision, and will attempt to show that a requirement of police coercion,
before a confession can be held involuntary, will clarify the law in this
area. This Note will also discuss the possible constitutional problems
presented by the Court's failure to require that the confession of a mentally ill defendant be verified by corroborating evidence, and by the
Court's lowering of the standard of proof required for proving the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver of fifth amendment protections.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's seminal confessions case, Brown v. Missis5. Id.
6. Id. at 518-19.

7. Id. at 59.
8. For a detailed discussion of the analysis and holding of the majority in
Connelly and an analysis ofJustice Brennan's dissent, see infra notes 86-127 and
accompanying text.

9. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960). These cases suggested that an absence of police overreaching
would not automatically make a confession voluntary if the confessor lacked free
will. For a discussion of Blackburn and Townsend, see infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
10. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
11. Id. at 524 (referring to waiver of fifth amendment rights under Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). For a discussion of Miranda, see infra notes 6065 and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 523.
13. For a discussion of the possible ramifications of Connelly on the rights of
criminal defendants, see infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
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sippi,' 4 was the first confessions case decided under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 15 In Brown, the murder convictions of three black men accused of killing a white man were reversed
because the convictions were based solely on confessions obtained by
brutal beatings of the prisoners administered by a deputy sheriff and
others.' 6 The Court noted: "It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure
the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of
due process."17

In Brown, the Court recognized that a confession obtained through
physical torture was involuntary and inadmissible under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In later cases the Court recognized that psychological pressures as well as physical force could induce
an involuntary and thus inadmissible confession. 18 Thus, the Court be14. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
15. An earlier confessions case that was not decided on due process
grounds is Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). The petitioner in Hopt challenged a murder conviction based in part on a confession he claimed was involuntary. Id. at 585. Though the conviction was reversed on other grounds, the
Court ruled that the confession was voluntary, basing the ruling not on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment but on English common law and
the writings of commentators. Id. at 583, 585-87. The Court proposed that a
confession was voluntary and reliable unless
the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of
the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of
will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the
meaning of the law.
Id. at 585.
Because no such "inducements, threats or promises" were made under the
circumstances of the confession, it was deemed voluntary and admissible. Id.
Another early confessions case, decided under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, was Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
The Bram opinion has been extensively criticized for applying fifth amendment
principles in a context where they were not appropriate. See LAw OF CONFESSIONS, supra note 2 at § 3.2 (under heading "An historical blunder-Bram v.
United States"). See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 191 n.35 (1953) (noting that Professor Wigmore considered Bram discredited by subsequent cases).

But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461-62 (1966) (declaring that reasoning of Bram had been adhered to by Court).

16. Brown, 297 U.S. at 284, 287.
17. Id. at 286.
18. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). The Watts Court noted:
There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by
fear as by force....
... When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial
whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the
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gan to look to the "totality of the circumstances" 19 to determine
whether a particular confession was the product of a free choice. 20 This
involved an examination of the external events surrounding the confession and an inference of the mental state of the suspect at the time of
21
confession.
The rationale for excluding involuntary confessions has undergone
a significant evolution. The common law rationale was that an involuntary confession was inherently untrustworthy as evidence in a criminal
trial. 22 Early Supreme Court confessions cases beginning with Brown reflect this concern for reliability. 2 3 In these same cases, however, the
product of the suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary.
Id. at 52, 53.
19. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 606 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
20. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620, 625 (1961) (holding
involuntary confession of suggestible "mental defective" held in custody and
interrogated repeatedly for four days); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196, 197

(1957) (holding involuntary confession of weak-willed suspect of low mentality
kept in isolation and questioned for one week); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948) (confession of fifteen-year-old suspect held involuntary after being obtained following five-hour early morning interrogation without presence of
friends or counsel).
21. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961).
22. Professor Wigmore summed up the early rationale: "The principle...

upon which a confession may be excluded is that it is, under certain conditions,
testimonially untrustworthy. Accordingly, the test propounded as the fundamental
criterion of admissibility was whether 'the inducement [was] such that there was
any fair risk of a false confession.'" 3 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 822 at 330 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
The "voluntariness-trustworthiness" approach is based on the premise that
an involuntary confession should not be admitted into evidence at trial because
a suspect subject to coercive interrogation tactics "is likely to say anything his
persecutors want him to in order to stop the persecution." Comment, The Coerced Confessions Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV., 313, 315-16
(1964) (footnote omitted).
Professor McCormick observed that the concern for reliability or trustworthiness has become a "relatively minor consideration supporting the requirement" that an involuntary confession not be admitted. C. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §

147, at 373 (3d ed. 1984).

23. See Developments, supra note 2, at 964. In some of the early cases in which
a confession was deemed involuntary and inadmissible, the Court stated its rationale for excluding the confession in very general terms. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 22, § 822, at 332. However, it was noted in Developments that the circumstances under which the confessions were obtained in these cases made them
clearly of suspect reliability. See Developments, supra note 2, at 964. In Brown, the
confession of one prisoner was obtained after the prisoner was hung from a tree
and repeatedly whipped while the confessions of the other prisoners were obtained after the prisoners were subjected to severe beatings with a leather strap

with buckles on it. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-82. In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940), the petitioners were prisoners arrested in the course of a mass
roundup of black men which occurred after a white man had been murdered.
The four petitioners in Chambers were subjected to a week of incommunicado,
all-night interrogations. Id. at 230-31.
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Supreme Court also emphasized the need to exclude involuntary confes24
sions in order to preserve the right to a fair trial.
In later Supreme Court cases, the rationale for excluding involuntary confessions shifted away from reliability and the preservation of a
fair trial. Instead, the Court emphasized that the reason for excluding
an involuntary confession was to deter unlawful or coercive conduct on
26
25
Finally, in Rogers v. Richmond,
the part of law enforcement officials.
Later Supreme Court cases explicitly articulated the concern for reliability.
See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). In Lyons, the Court stated: "A
coerced confession is offensive to basic standards ofjustice, not because the victim has a legal grievance against the police, but because declarations procured
by torture are not premises from which a civilized forum will infer guilt." Id. at
605. In Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), the Court stated: "Reliance on
a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a confession combines
the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience
shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a false foundation for any conviction ..
" Id. at 192. The Stein rationale was repudiated by
the Court in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). For a discussion of
Rogers and the repudiation of Stein, see infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
24. See Paulsen, The FourteenthAmendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv.
411, 414-17 (1954). In Brown, the Court stated that "[tihe conviction and sentence were void for want of the essential elements of due process ..
" 297 U.S.
at 287. The Court noted more specifically: "The trial equally is a mere pretense
where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence." Id. at 286.
Another case where the Court emphasized the need for preserving a fair
trial is Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). There the Court asserted that
in order to find a denial of due process, "the acts complained of must be of such
quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial." Id. at 236. Similarly, the right to a
public trial figured prominently in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
In Ashcraft, the Court stated:
It is inconceivable that any court ofjustice in the land, conducted as our
courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-examination
for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a "voluntary" confession. Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same
thing away from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open
court room.
Id. at 154. See also Comment, supra note 22, at 320-24.
The "untrustworthiness" and "fair trial" rationales seem to be well intertwined in the cases. In Developments, supra note 2, it is suggested that the "fair
trial" rationale is aimed, in part, at keeping out untrustworthy confessions, but
that it also protects other interests:
[I]t is difficult to separate out the factfinding virtues of the adversary
system from the other values that the system protects, and the Court's
emphasis on the differences between police interrogation and trial suggests stricter limits on the use of confessions than merely a rule against
the use of untrustworthy evidence.
Id. at 966.
25. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Watts represents an interesting example of the shift from the fair trial/trustworthiness rationale to the police-deterrence rationale. The Watts Court noted:
[T]o turn the detention of an accused into a process of wrenching from
him evidence which could not be extorted in open court with all its
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27
The
the Court formally repudiated the untrustworthiness rationale.
Rogers Court stated that the potential untrustworthiness of an involuntary confession is not the reason for its exclusion and held that proof of
the probable truth or falsity of a suspect's confession is not permitted in
evaluating the voluntariness of a statement. 28 Thus, an involuntary confession obtained by police coercion cannot be admitted even if the con-

safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as to offend the
procedural standards of due process.
This is so because it violates the underlying principle in our enforcement of the criminal law. Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to
the inquisitorial system.
Id. at 54. The Court held that the due process clause bars police procedures
which violate basic notions of "our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime ...
Id. at 55.
The de-emphasis of the untrustworthiness rationale was made explicit in
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). The Spano Court stated:
[Tjhe abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
Accordingly, the actions of police in obtaining confessions
the law ....
have come under scrutiny in a long series of cases."
Id. at 320-21 (footnote omitted).
It is interesting to note that the concern for reliability as the sole rationale
for excluding involuntary confessions was looked upon skeptically as early as
1941, in Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). There, the Court noted:
"The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily
The aim of the requirement of due promade is to exclude false evidence ....
cess is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false." 314 U.S. at 236.
26. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
27. Id. at 543-44. Prior to the Rogers decision, the Court returned for a
brief period to the view that an involuntary confession is excluded not to deter
coercive police tactics, but solely to keep out untrustworthy evidence. See Stein
v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). The Stein Court stated:
Reliance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a
confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness
with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a false foundation for any conviction,
while evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, wire tapping, or
larceny may be and often is of the utmost verity. Such police lawlessness therefore may not void state convictions while forced confessions
will do so.
Id. at 192.
The Stein doctrine proved to be a "short-lived departure from prior views of
the Court ... and was unequivocally put to rest in Rogers v. Richmond." Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384 (1964). The Court in Jackson stated that "Stein v.
New York is overruled." Id. at 391.
28. The Rogers Court expounded:
From a fair reading of these expressions, we cannot but conclude
that the question whether Rogers' confessions were admissible into evidence was answered by reference to a legal standard which took into
account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity. And this is not a
permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
365 U.S. at 543-44 (footnote omitted).
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29

fession is later proved reliable.
In Blackburn v. Alabama,30 a case decided one year before Rogers, the
Supreme Court introduced two other concerns into the rationale underlying the exclusion of involuntary confessions: a concern for fairness
and a concern that a confession be made with a "free will and rational
intellect."' 3 1 The petitioner in Blackburn was a man with a history of serious mental problems, including paranoid schizophrenia, who allegedly
committed a robbery during an unauthorized absence from a mental
ward. 3 2 The petitioner introduced expert testimony at trial to prove
that he was insane at the time he confessed to the robbery.3 3 The confession was obtained after an eight or nine hour interrogation in a small
room with as many as three police officers present.3 4 ChiefJustice Warren, writing for the Court, examined the voluntariness of the confession,
noting the "complex of values" underlying the proscription against state
use of involuntary confessions. 3 5 Chief Justice Warren then presented
this passage:
In the case at bar, the evidence indisputably establishes the
strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed. Surely in the present
stage of our civilization a most basic sense ofjustice is affronted
by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis
of a statement he made while insane; and this judgment can
without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of
29. Id. at 541. The Court noted that in many cases where the confession of
a suspect was excluded because the methods used to obtain it violated due process, the confession was actually verified by corroborating evidence. Id.
30. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
31. For a discussion of fairness as a rationale for the exclusion of an involuntary confession, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. For an analysis of
the "free will and rational intellect" language used by the Court, see infra notes
36-37 and accompanying text.
32. 361 U.S. at 201.
33. Id.at 203.
34. Id. at 204.
35. Id. at 207. After discussing the objectives of preserving free will, ensuring the reliability of confessions and deterring police coercion, Chief Justice
Warren stated:
Neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the preservation of the individual's freedom of will is the sole interest at stake. As
we said just last Term, "The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confession . . .also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life
and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to
convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture against use by
the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this
Court terms involuntary, and the role played by each in any situation
varies according to the particular circumstances of the case.
Id. at 207 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)).
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the confession, the lack of rational choice of the accused, or
simply a strong conviction that our system of law enforcement
should not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this
fashion. And when the other pertinent circumstances are considered-the eight-to-nine-hour sustained interrogation in a
tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with police
officers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal
counsel; the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn-the chances of the confession's
having been the product of a rational intellect and a free will
become even more remote and the denial of due process even
36
more egregious.
The language "[aind when the other pertinent circumstances are
considered ... the chances of the confession's having been the product
of a rational intellect and a free will become even more remote and the
denial of due process even more egregious," 3 7 suggests that the petitioner's insanity or mental condition alone, apart from any coercive activity on the part of the police, was sufficient to render the confession
involuntary.3 8 The fact that the Court spoke of "taking advantage" of
the insane defendant prior to the Court's description of the interrogation process suggests that our legal system takes advantage of a mentally
incompetent defendant simply by using his confession against him in
court as the basis for conviction, regardless of the manner in which the
confession was obtained. There is an element of concern for "fair play"
in the passage, not solely in the context of police interrogation, but in a
legal system which will convict an insane person by using his own words
39
against him.
36. Id. at 207-08.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. A number of courts have followed this interpretation. For a discussion
of these cases, see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
39. See People v. Brown, 86 Misc. 2d 339, 380 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1975). The
court in Brown noted: "Fairness is the pivot upon which voluntariness turns for
those who advocate a literal application of Blackburn's 'rational intellect and free
will' language." Id. at 348, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 485,
This notion of "fair play" receives in-depth treatment in Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 909-19 (1979). The
author states:
Fairness in the context of police interrogation ... does not require
the defendant and the interrogating officer to be comparably matched
in skills or ability, nor does it require equality among defendants with
respect to ability or opportunity to outsmart the interrogating officer.
To the contrary, we are pleased when police interrogation succeeds.
Nevertheless, although police interrogation is not considered a sporting contest between comparably advantaged contestants, the notion of
"fair play" cannot be ignored altogether. We may find it morally troubling, for example, when police include a confession by taking advantage
of a suspect's age or mental impairment.

Id. at 915 (footnote omitted).
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Three years later, the Court reinforced the "rational intellect and
free will" reasoning of Blackburn in Townsend v. Sain.40

In Townsend,

Chief Justice Warren characterized Blackburn as a case in which the motives of the police were irrelevant:
Any questioning by police officers which infact produces a
confession which is not the product of a free intellect renders
that confession inadmissible ....

[Iln Blackburn v. Alabama, we

held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper purpose on
the part of the questioning officers. There the evidence indicated that the interrogating officers thought the defendant sane
when he confessed, but we judged the confession inadmissible
was that the defendant was in fact inbecause the probability
41
sane at the time.
This language in Townsend, along with the "rational intellect and
free will" passage in Blackburn, led to a diversity of opinion in lower federal courts and state courts over whether to apply literally the "free will
and rational intellect" test for voluntariness and also whether improper
police actions and motives are necessary to find a confession
42
involuntary.
At least one state court interpreted Blackburn as meaning that the
confession of an insane person is always involuntary, even without official coercion. 4 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit took a more philosophical approach to the same prob40. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The petitioner, Townsend, a heroin addict,
claimed that his confession was involuntary because it was given after a doctor
had given him an injection of hycosine, which Townsend claimed had the
properties of a "truth serum." Id. at 298. The police claimed that the drug had

been administered only to alleviate Townsend's heroin withdrawal symptoms,
and that they did not know of its properties as a "truth serum." Id. at 298-99.
The Court held the motives of the police irrelevant if the drug in fact caused the
petitioner to confess. Id. at 308-09.
41. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
42. One reason for the diversity of opinion may be the inherent vagueness
of the language in Blackburn. In Developments, supra note 2, the author discussed
the ambiguity of the decision:
In Blackburn v. Alabama ...[the Court] held that a madman's confession
was inadmissible, declaring that use of the confession at trial affronted

"a most basic sense of justice," and continuing on to say that "this

judgment can without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational choice of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our system of law enforcement should not
operate so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion." Such pronouncements were bound to leave lower courts without a clear idea of
which circumstances surrounding an interrogation are especially relevant to the due process issue. The vacuum has been filled by a great
variety of attempts by lower federal courts, state supreme courts, and
commentators to state the requirement of due process in this context.
Developments, supra note 2, at 962-63 (quoting Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207).
43. State v. Aviles, 45 NJ. 152, 156, 211 A.2d 796, 799 (1965) ("Blackburn
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lem in Pea v. United States,4 4 a case that did not involve insanity. The
defendant in Pea, while confined in a hospital, confessed to shooting his
wife and then himself in the head. 45 At the time of the confession, the
defendant had a concussion and was lethargic and intoxicated. 46
Though the court concluded that the questioning detective's conduct
was reasonable, and there was no reason to doubt the reliability of the
47
confession, the court nevertheless held the confession involuntary.
The court discussed the "tension of manifold forces" within a person,
including the mechanism of self-preservation, that contributes toward
the freedom of choice necessary for a free will and intellect. 48 The court
concluded: "[A person's] statement does not reflect his own free will or
intellect if his statement is attributable in critical measure to the fact that
his self-protective mechanism is negated or overridden by external force
or fraud, a condition of insanity, [or] the compulsion of drugs." '49 The
court then held that the defendant's statement was involuntary, as the
external condition of the defendant's concussion and the bullet in his
50
head caused him to be indifferent to protecting himself.
Other courts have reasoned along similar lines and have concluded
that a condition of insanity or other "external" force such as intoxicaestablishes that the confession of an insane defendant is involuntary and
inadmissible .. ").
There are numerous cases predating Blackburn that rule on the admissibility
of a confession made by an insane person. See, e.g., State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289,
300, 347 P.2d 312, 319-20 (1959) ("An inane person can commit no rational,
voluntary act. He can do nothing intentionally. Neither can he know of his constitutional right. His confession is therefore a nullity.") (quoting People v.
Shroyer, 336 Ill. 324, 326, 168 N.E. 336, 336 (1929)); State v. Campbell, 301
Mo. 618, 623, 257 S.W. 131, 133 (1923) ("A confession of an insane person [is]
no confession at all."); People v. Wreden, 59 Cal. 392, 396 (1881) ("It is quite
obvious that the utterances of an insane man ought not to be treated as evidence
against himself....").
But see Redwine v. State, 36 Ala. App. 560, 565, 61 So. 2d 715, 719 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1952) ("[I]n the absence of total insanity, neither the voluntary character of a confession nor its admissibility is affected by the mental instability of
the person making it, such mental condition being for consideration by the jury
in determining the weight of the confession."), cert. denied, 258 Ala. 196, 61 So.
2d 724 (1952).
The general rule from these cases is that mental subnormality standing

alone, short of insanity, does not necessarily have an exclusionary effect, but
may be a factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. 3 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 22, § 841, at 493-94. See also Annotation, Mental Subnormality of Accused
As Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of Confession, 69 A.L.R.2d 348 (1960)
(whether one who has subnormal mental abilities is capable of making a voluntary confession).
44. 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
45. Id. at 629.
46. Id. at 633.
47. Id. at 632, 636.
48. Id. at 634.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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tion may induce a confession that is not the product of a rational intellect and free will, and thus is involuntary, even in the absence of
51
improper police conduct or coercive tactics.
Another series of cases has reached the opposite conclusion-that
some form of governmental coercion is a necessary predicate for a finding of involuntariness, notwithstanding the mental condition of the confessor. 52 United States v. Bernett 53 is a case which supports this position.
51. See, e.g., Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1968). The Glad-

den court stated that voluntariness is not necessarily established by proving that
a confession was spontaneous or by proving absence of improper purpose on
the part of questioning officers. Id. at 380. The court stated that mental illness,
drugs or extreme intoxication may induce a confession which is not the product
of a rational intellect and free will. Id.
In People v. MacPherson, 2 Cal. 3d 109, 465 P.2d 17, 84 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1970), a schizophrenic murder suspect jammed a pencil in his own eye while in
jail and yelled, "I killed him! I killed him!" The California Supreme Court concluded that the statement was involuntary as he was unable to comprehend the
seriousness of his predicament and noted that it was immaterial that the statements were not elicited by law enforcement officials. Id. at 115, 465 P.2d at 21,
84 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
In Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972), the court considered the voluntariness of a statement made by an insane
murder suspect. 452 F.2d at 863-64. The court, in vacating the lower court's
decision to deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, noted that the lower
court may not have used the proper test in determining the voluntariness of the
statements. The court stated: "While [the lower court] considered it relevant
that there were no threats, pressure, or suggestions by police officers, the court
failed to take into account that the defendant's insanity may have deprived him
of his freedom of choice, the essence of his ability to make a voluntary confession." Id. (citation omitted).
The rationale of Pea, Gladden and Eisen was adopted in State v. Glover, 343
So. 2d 118 (La. 1976). The Glover court noted that some courts have adopted
the view that a confession may be involuntary in the due process sense only
where the declarant has been subjected to police custody, external pressure or
coercion. Id. at 128. The court rejected this view as incorrect and destructive of
the very purposes of the voluntariness requirement. Id.
52. See Commonwealth v. Masskow, 362 Mass. 662, 290 N.E.2d 154 (1972).
In Masskow, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that its previous
decisions were contrary to the decision in Eisen v. Picard,which held that insanity
alone may induce an involuntary confession. For a discussion of Eisen, see supra
note 51. However, the Masskow court assumed that Eisen was an accurate statement of federal law, in order to avoid having its decision later overturned in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 668-69, 290 N.E.2d at 157-58. Similarly, in Britt v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1974) the court noted that
"[t]he search for a definition of'free' volition is indeed a long day's journey into
nowhere." Id. at 500.
A similar reasoning was followed by the court in People v. Brown, 86 Misc.
2d 339, 380 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1975). The Brown court noted: "Unlike confessions
which occur after nine hours of custodial interrogation (Blackburn v. Alabama)
...or custodial confessions by defendants susceptible to suggestion (People v.
MacPherson) ... , the use of spontaneous noncustodial confessions does not
violate the traditional notions of fairness summarized in the guarantee of due
process of law." Id. at 349, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (citations omitted). Brown involved a situation very much like that in Connelly in that the defendant in Brown, a
mentally ill woman, freely walked into a police station and confessed to a mur-
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In Bernelt, the defendant blurted out an incriminating statement to a policeman after the officer had asked him his name in connection with a
murder investigation. 54 At the pre-trial suppression hearing, Bernett
did not contend that he was insane; rather, he asserted that his intoxi55
cated condition had made the confession involuntary.
The court held that since the defendant's statement was made in a
non-custodial setting and was uncoerced, it could not have been involuntary within the meaning of the decided cases. 5 6 The court stated that
the broad language of Blackburn "must be analyzed against its factual
background-nine hours of interrogation of a mental incompetent in a
police-filled room" and so distinguished Blackburn on its facts. 57 The
court found that "[t]he normal rules of evidence on competence and
prejudice provide a sufficient safeguard with respect to the admission or
exclusion of this type [of] evidence." ' 58 The court stated that the real
issue at hand was the trustworthiness of the confession, which is not a
59
constitutional question but instead is a classic question for the jury.
The law of confessions has also been greatly influenced by a series
of Supreme Court cases dealing with the fifth amendment aspects of
confessions, which are grounded in the privilege against self-incrimination. The most significant case in this regard is Miranda v. Arizona.60 In
Miranda, the Court held that any statements made by a suspect in response to custodial interrogation will not be admitted into evidence unless the police have given the appropriate procedural safeguards in the
form of the now-famous "Miranda warnings". 61 The Court also held
der. Unlike Connelly, however, the court found that her mental condition did not
rise to the level of insanity. Id. at 345, 380 NY.S.2d at 482-83. For a discussion
of the facts of Connelly, see infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
53. 495 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 946.
55. Id. at 947. For due process voluntariness purposes, intoxication is
sometimes treated the same as a mental illness. The dissent in Bernett noted:
"Taking 'rationality' and 'free will' in the sense in which the Supreme Court has
employed these terms, no basis appears for treating extreme intoxication differently from insanity, drugs, torture or psychological duress for purposes of applying the voluntariness doctrine." Id. at 955 (Robinson, J., dissenting in part).

For a general discussion on the effect of intoxication on the voluntariness of
a confession, see generally 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 841, at 489-93.
56. Bernett, 495 F.2d at 965.

57. Id. at 968.
58. Id. at 967.
59. Id.
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
61. Id.at 478-79. The Court stated:
[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss5/5

12

Gehring: Colorado v. Connelly: The Demise of Free Will as an Independent B

1988]

NOTE

907

that the prosecution then has the burden of demonstrating that the suspect made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his fifth
amendment rights. 6 2 The recent case of Moran v. Burbine63 further clarified the standards governing the waiver of the rights outlined in the Miranda warnings:
The inquiry has two distinct dimensions . . . First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver
must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court
64
properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
Thus, though the fifth amendment confessions cases and the fourteenth amendment confessions cases involve two distinct constitutional
rights, the privilege against self-incrimination and the guarantees of due
process respectively, each has a "voluntariness" component. They differ in that a valid Miranda waiver requires more than mere voluntariness.
A valid Miranda waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently as well
65
as voluntarily.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Connelly Decision

Colorado v. Connelly is the latest confessions case decided by the
Supreme Court on due process grounds. 6 6 The case ends the confusion
created by the "free will and rational intellect" language of Blackburn.
62. Id. at 444.
63. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
64. Id. at 1141 (citations omitted).
65. Id.

66. Connelly's initial statements to the police, made before he was taken
into custody, could not have involved issues relating to the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. A fifth amendment Miranda situation only
occurs if a defendant is subjected to "custodial interrogation." See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 437; W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 6.6 & 6.7 (1985).
Connelly's initial statements were not made in circumstances of custodial interrogation by any standards defining this term. Id. Thus, Connelly was not left
with a fifth amendment Miranda argument as to his non-custodial statements and
he necessarily had to fall back on a fourteenth amendment due process
argument.

Connelly made a fifth amendment argument as to the statements he made

while in custody, after he was handcuffed by a police officer. Connelly, 107 S. Ct.
at 523 n.3. The issue as to these statements became not whether his statements
were involuntary, but whether he had made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.

Id. at 523-24.
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The Connelly Court delivered a three-part holding. First, the Court held
that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a
confession is involuntary within the meaning of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 67 Second, the Court held that where a
state bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that
the defendant claims was obtained in violation of the Miranda doctrine,
the state need prove waiver by only a preponderance of the evidence. 68
Third, the Court held that the Colorado Supreme Court erred in finding
that the defendant had not made a voluntary waiver of his fifth amendment rights, since no official coercion was involved in obtaining the
69
waiver.
The facts of Connelly are unique and might limit the broad holding
that the Court set forth on the voluntariness issue. On August 18, 1983,
Francis Connelly approached a Denver police officer "and without any
prompting, stated that he had murdered someone and wanted to talk
about it."' 70 The officer immediately advised Connelly of his Miranda
rights. 7 1 Connelly stated that he understood these rights but h6 still
wanted to talk about the murder. 72 Connelly told the officer that he had
been a patient in several mental hospitals, but to the officer he appeared
to understand his acts. 73 A detective arrived and Connelly told him that
he had come all the way from Boston to confess to murdering a young
girl the previous year.7 4 After the police confirmed that in April of 1983
the body of an unidentified female had been found, Connelly led the
75
police to the scene of the murder.
Up until this point, Connelly showed no indication that he was mentally ill but during an interview with the public defender the next morning, he became "visibly disoriented" and stated for the first time that
"voices" had told him to go to Denver to confess to the killing. 76 He

was sent to a state hospital for evaluation where he was found incompetent to stand trial. It was approximately six months before Connelly was
77
determined to be competent to proceed to trial.
At a preliminary hearing, Connelly moved tc suppress all of his
statements, both pre-custodial and post-custodial. 78 A psychiatrist who
67. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
68. Id. at 523.

69. Id. at 523-24.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 519.

78. 107 S. Ct. at 519. The preliminary hearing was made in observance of
the constitutional requirements set forth in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368

(1964). TheJackson Court held that a hearing "separate and apart from the body
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had examined him testified that Connelly was a chronic schizophrenic
who was experiencing "command hallucinations" which interfered with
his "ability to make iree and rational choices." ' 79 The psychiatrist further testified that though Connelly understood his rights when the police advised him that he need not speak, it was his opinion that
Connelly's psychosis motivated his confession. 8 0 On the basis of this
evidence, the Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the
grounds of involuntariness because they were not the product of a rational intellect and free will, even though the court found no coercive
activity on the part of the police.8 1 The trial court further held that
Connelly's mental state vitiated his attempted waivers of the right to
82
counsel and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the confession was involuntary. The supreme court stated that
a lack of police coercion or duress did not foreclose a finding of involuntariness since the statements were not made with a rational intellect and
free will. 83 The court stated that the very admission of a confession into
evidence in a court of law was sufficient state action to implicate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 4 The court also held that
because of Connelly's mental condition, he lacked the ability to make a
valid waiver of his constitutional rights. 85
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the United States
Supreme Court, reversed the judgment of the Colorado Supreme
Court.8

6

The Court first addressed the voluntariness issue.8 7

The

trying guilt or innocence" must be held in order to decide the issue of the voluntariness of a confession, which the prosecution seeks to use as evidence against
the accused. Id. at 394. Further, the procedure used must be "fully adequate to
insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession, including the resolution of disputed facts upon which the voluntariness
issue may depend." Id. at 391.
79. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519. The psychiatrist testified that Connelly believed that the "voice of God" had commanded him to withdraw money from the
bank, buy an airplane ticket and fly from Boston to Denver. Id. When Connelly
arrived in Denver, "God's voice" became stronger and commanded him to
either confess to the killing or commit suicide. Id. Although it was the psychiatrist's opinion that the hallucinations interfered with Connelly's ability to make a
free and rational choice, he admitted that the "voices" could in reality be Connelly's interpretation of his own guilt. Id.
80. Id.

81. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 729 (Colo. 1985), rev'd, Colorado v.
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
82. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
83. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d at 729.

84. Id. at 728-29 (citing Hunter v. People, 655 P.2d 374, 375-76 (Colo.
1982)).
85. Id.
86. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524. ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion in Connelly, in which Justices White, Powell, O'Connor and Scaliajoined.
Id. at 518. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment. Id. at 524 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed an
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Court stated that the cases the Court had considered over the fifty years
since Brown had focused upon police overreaching, not just on the
mental condition of the defendant.8 8 The Court stated that although
the mental condition of the defendant is a significant factor in the voluntariness calculation, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion it should never settle the voluntariness question. 89
The Court found that Connelly's reliance on Blackburn and Townsend
was misplaced because those cases contained an "integral element of
police overreaching." 90 The Court noted that Blackburn specifically condemned activity that "wrings a confession out of an accused against his
will." 9 ' The Court also stated that by concluding that sufficient state
action was present by admission of the evidence into a state court, the
Colorado Supreme Court failed to recognize the essential link between
coercive activity of the state and a resulting confession by the defendant. 9 2 The Court noted that suppressing Connelly's statements would
not serve to enforce constitutional guarantees, because none of his constitutional rights had been violated. 9 3 The Court concluded this part of
the analysis by emphasizing its reluctance to expand exclusionary rules
that might bar truthful and probative evidence. 94 Any problems of unopinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 524-25 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For
synopses of the concurring opinions, see infra note 108. For a discussion of the
dissenting opinion, see infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 519-22.
88. Id. at 520.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 520-21.
91. Id. at 521 (quoting Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206-07).
92. This view of the majority opinion finds support in Grano, supra note 39.
The author states:
[W]hen a defendant's confession is used at trial, a resulting conviction
violates due process only if the introduction of the confession offends
due process precepts. This in turn requires a constitutionally significant nexus between the police interrogation methods and the defendant's confession. This nexus is present when the police obtain the
confession by unduly impairing mental freedom or by unfairly influencing or taking advantage of the defendant. It is also present when a likelihood exists that the interrogation methods induced the defendant to
condemn himself falsely. Absent implication of these due process concerns, however, the police interrogation conduct cannot have the requisite relationship to the confession and thus to the ultimate conviction to
justify due process review.
Id. at 924 (footnote omitted). It is likely that the author would agree that, without any interrogation by the police, as in Connelly, a constitutionally significant
nexus is not present.
93. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. The Court stated: "Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right-the right of a criminal defendant to
confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated-could
respondent's present claim be sustained." Id.
94. Id. at 521-22.
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reliability, the Court stated, could be resolved by the evidentiary laws of
the forum and were not a concern of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 5 The Court held that coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and, therefore, taking Connelly's statements and admitting them into evidence did
96
not violate that clause.
In the next part of the opinion, the majority ostensibly reaffirmed
its holding in Lego v. Twomey. 9 7 The Supreme Court held in Lego that, in
a pre-trial hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confession, the
state only needs to prove the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. 98 In Connelly, the Court held that whenever the
state bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that
the defendant claims was made in violation of the Miranda doctrine, the
state need only prove a valid Miranda waiver by a preponderance of the
evidence. 99 The Court in fact enlarged the holding in Lego by holding
that the waiver of the "auxiliary protections" established in Miranda
need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0 0 Lego addressed only the standard of proof necessary to prove that a confession
was made voluntarily. Connelly makes the same standard applicable in
proving that a Miranda waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, as
0
well as voluntarily.' '
95. Id. at 522.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 523. In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), the petitioner
sought to suppress a confession that he claimed was obtained after he was
beaten by police officers. The trialjudge ruled the confession admissible and
the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery. Id. at 480. The petitioner later
challenged the voluntariness of the confession, maintaining that the trial judge
should have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before
admitting it into evidence. Id. at 481.
98. 404 U.S. at 489. The Lego Court based its holding on two separate principles. First, since the purpose of a voluntariness hearing has nothing to do with
improving the reliability of jury verdicts, judging the admissibility of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence would not undermine the mandate of
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where it was held that the elements of a
crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Lego, 404 U.S. at 486.
Second, the independent values protected by the exclusionary rule do not
require a reasonable doubt standard for proving admissibility of a confession.
The Court stated that there was no substantial evidence demonstrating that federal rights had suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance standard. Id. at 488.
99. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
100. Id. The Connelly Court deftly made the transition from the Lego holding to its present holding: "If, as we held in Lego v. Twomey ... the voluntariness

of a confession need be established only by a preponderance of the evidence,
then a waiver of the auxiliary protections established in Miranda should require
no higher burden of proof." Id. at 522 (citation omitted).
101. For a discussion of the requirements of a valid Miranda waiver, see
supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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The Connelly Court next examined whether the Colorado Supreme
Court erred in its analysis of whether the respondent Connelly had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 10 2 The Court held that the Colorado
Supreme Court erred by importing into its constitutional analysis "notions of 'free will' that have no place there."' 1 3 The Court stated that
there was no reason to require more in the way of a voluntariness inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the fourteenth amendment
due process context.10 4 Accordingly, the Court held that the state court
erred in finding that the waiver was involuntary in the absence of official
coercion. 105 The Court stated that while Miranda protects against governmental coercion which leads criminal defendants to surrender fifth
amendment rights, it goes no further than that. 10 6 Therefore, Connelly's perception of coercion flowing from the voice of God "is a matter
0 7
to which the United States Constitution does not speak."'
Justice Brennan wrote a vigorous dissent in which he criticized the
majority's "unprecedented" holding on the voluntariness issue.108 Jus102. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 523-24. Although the Colorado Supreme Court could have
found Connelly's Miranda waiver invalid for not being "knowing" or "intelligent," the Court chose to reverse the entire judgment on this issue. The majority explained its reasoning in a footnote:
It is possible to read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado as finding respondent's Miranda waiver invalid on other grounds.
Even if that is the case, however, we nonetheless reverse the judgment
in its entirety because of our belief that the Supreme Court of Colorado's analysis was influenced by its mistaken view of "voluntariness"
in the constitutional sense. Reconsideration of other issues, not inconsistent with our opinion, is of course open to the Supreme Court of
Colorado on remand.
Id. at 524 n.4.
In light of this limiting language, the majority's analysis and holding regarding the standards for a valid Miranda waiver do not appear to affect the "knowing
and intelligent" prong of the Miranda waiver test beyond the issue of the state's
burden of proof in demonstrating a valid waiver.
106. Id. at 524.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion began:
"Today the Court denies Mr. Connelly his fundamental right to make a vital
choice with a sane mind, involving a determination that could allow the State to
deprive him of liberty or even life." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
Justice Blackmun wrote a short concurring opinion, joining the majority on
everything except the issue of the state's burden of proof in demonstrating a
valid Miranda waiver. Justice Blackmun contended the state's burden of proof
was neither raised nor briefed by the parties and not necessary to the decision.
Id. at 524 (Blackmun J., concurring).

Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, analyzed the admissibility of
Connelly's statement solely with reference to the fifth amendment. He stated
that he was willing to accept the state court's finding that Connelly's pre-custodial statements were involuntary. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and
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tice Brennan argued that the Court had never, in the long line of due
process "voluntariness" cases, confined its focus to police coercion because "the value of freedom of will has demanded a broader inquiry." 10 9 Justice Brennan rejected the majority's characterization of
Blackburn and Townsend as cases that focused primarily on police wrongdoing, noting that the Townsend Court analyzed Blackburn as a case where
the police harbored no improper purpose.1 10 Justice Brennan further
argued that the Colorado Supreme Court was correct in holding that the
admission into evidence of Connelly's confession was sufficient state action to invoke the fourteenth amendment due process protections. 1 1,
Justice Brennan concluded that, by holding that police misconduct is
necessary to find a confession involuntary, the majority had ignored the
Court's historical insistence that only confessions reflecting an exercise
2
of free will should be admitted into evidence."
Justice Brennan next focused on the potential unreliability of confessions made by mentally ill defendants.13 Justice Brennan noted that
reliability was previously not a factor in determining the voluntariness of
confessions since all involuntary confessions, regardless of reliability,
were excluded from evidence. 1 4 Now, stated Justice Brennan, the
Court's restrictive definition of an "involuntary" confession requires
dissenting in part). Nevertheless, he agreed with the Court that these statements need not be suppressed. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated that the admission of the pre-custodial
statements did not violate the fifth amendment because the statements were not
the product of state compulsion. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). However, Justice Stevens stated that once Connelly was taken
into custody, the questioning assumed a presumptively coercive characteristic
and could not go forward unless Connelly validly waived his constitutional
rights. Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). Since
Connelly was then not competent to stand trial, Justice Stevens would have
found that he was not competent to waive his constitutional right to remain silent. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
concluded that the Colorado Supreme Court was "unquestionably correct" in
holding that Connelly's post-custodial incriminating statements were inadmissible. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan disagreed with
the Court's assertion that the long line of cases on the voluntariness issue had
focused on police overreaching. Id.at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice

Brennan stated that while these cases all involved an element of police misconduct, free will was always an "independent concern." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The fact that involuntary confessions have always been excluded in part
because of police overreaching, signifies only that this is a case of first impression." Id. at 527-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the passage in which the
Townsend Court characterized Blackburn as a case in which improper motives on
the part of the police were irrelevant to the voluntariness determination, see
supra note 41 and accompanying text.

111. Id. at 528-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the origins of
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heightened scrutiny of a confession's reliability.' 1 5 Justice Brennan concluded that "[m]inimum standards of due process .

.

. require that the

trial court find substantial indicia of reliability.., extrinsic to the confession itself, before admitting the confession of a mentally ill person into
evidence."' 16
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the majority's decision that the
prosecution need only prove the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver by a

preponderance of the evidence." 7 Justice Brennan argued that this
holding broke with the precedent of Miranda and other cases which require "high standards of proof" and place a "heavy" burden on the government in proving the validity of a waiver of fifth and sixth amendment
rights.'18 Justice Brennan argued that the reasoning of Lego, on which

the Connelly majority based its holding, was flawed.1

9

Even if Lego was

the rule that reliability cannot be considered in determining the voluntariness of
confessions, see supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted that the
majority "inappropriately" addressed this issue as well as the issue of the effect
of the defendant's mental illness on his attempted Miranda waiver, because
neither issue was raised in the prosecutor's petition for certiorari. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
Earlier, Justice Brennan had vehemently opposed the Court's grant of certiorari. Colorado v. Connelly, 106 S. Ct. 785 (1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting). In
granting certiorari in the case, the Court instructed: "In addition to the question presented for writ of certiorari, the parties are requested to brief and argue
the following question: Did respondent's mental condition render his waiver of

Miranda rights ineffective?" Id.
In his dissent from the briefing order, Justice Brennan stated that by this

action the Court had taken the "unprecedented step of rewriting a prosecutor's
certiorari petition for him, enabling him to seek reversal on a ground he did not
present himself." Id. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated
that by doing so, the Court gives "the appearance of being not merely the champion, but actually an arm of the prosecution." Id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that this made Supreme Court Rule 21.1(a)

meaningless. Rule 21.1(a) reads in part: "Only the questions set forth in the
petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court." Id. at 78687 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Sup. CT. R. 21.1(a)). Justice Brennan said
that this action was especially inappropriate in this case because the prosecutor's
petition for certiorari had expressly stated: "[Respondent's] later confession,

which involves a Miranda issue, is not an issue in this petition." Connelly, 106 S.
Ct. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
cited the following cases: Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-71 (1985)
(Court "firmly reiterates" that prosecution's burden in proving validity of Miranda waiver is great); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) ("The
courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's
burden is great ..
"); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)
("To preserve the fairness of the trial process the Court established an appropri-

ately heavy burden on the Government before waiver could be found.
...);
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (government has "heavy burden" in proving waiver).
119. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
reiterated his dissent in Lego. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stated that the
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decided correctly, Justice Brennan argued, the holding would not apply
to Connelly.12 0 Justice Brennan stated that while the Lego holding rested
on the presumption that all involuntary confessions are excluded, the
Connelly Court redefined "involuntary" to include only confessions obtained by official coercion. 12 1 In light of this, stated Justice Brennan,
reliability of jury verdicts is at stake, and proof beyond a reasonable
22
doubt is the appropriate burden of proof.'
Justice Brennan concluded by questioning the analysis the majority
12 3
set forth for evaluating the Miranda waiver of a mentally ill defendant.
Justice Brennan stated that he rejected the majority's analysis of voluntariness in a Miranda waiver context for the same reasons he rejected the
majority's voluntariness analysis in a due process context. 124 Justice
Brennan also questioned the majority's decision to reverse the entire
judgment on voluntariness grounds, because the Colorado Supreme
Court could have found the Miranda waiver invalid on the grounds that
it was not "knowing and intelligent."1 2 5 Justice Brennan noted that failure to meet either the "voluntary" or "knowing" or "intelligent" requirements provides an independent justification for suppression of a
custodial confession. 12 6 "Since the Colorado Supreme Court found
that Mr. Connelly was 'clearly' unable to make an 'intelligent' decision,"
27
Justice Brennan would have affirmed the judgment.'
"constitutional ideal that involuntary confessions should never be admitted
against the defendant in criminal cases deserves protection by the highest standard of proof-proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan further asserted that the lower standard of proof would result
"in the admission of more involuntary confessions than would be admitted were
the prosecution required to meet a higher standard." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Lego, 404 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
120. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

121. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also stated that Lego did
not apply because it involved a situation where the defendant was not in custody,
while a Miranda waiver situation only occurs when a suspect is in police custody.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation makes it appropriate to place a higher burden
of proof on the government in establishing a valid waiver of Miranda rights. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
However, the Lego Court stated: "The evidence introduced against Lego at
trial included a confession he had made to police after arrest and while in custody
at the station house." 404 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). It was this confession that
Lego sought to have suppressed. Id. Therefore, Justice Brennan's analysis of
Lego as a case involving a non-custodial confession appears to be erroneous.
123. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). For a discussion ofJustice Brennan's objections to the majority's voluntariness analysis, which imposes a requirement of

police coercion for a finding of involuntariness, see supra notes 108-16 and aiccompanying text.
125. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 533 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Discussion

It is submitted that the Supreme Court, by holding that coercive
police activity is necessary for a confession to be involuntary for due
process purposes, clarified the law of confessions. The Court did this by
providing lower courts with an objective standard for making the voluntariness determination. This objective standard will enhance the predictability and uniformity of this area of law.
However, in doing so, the Court failed to adequately address the
potential unreliability of confessions made by mentally ill persons. Furthermore, the Court's holding that the government need only prove the
validity of a Miranda waiver by a preponderance of the evidence is a
break with precedent that may have a negative impact upon the rights of
criminal defendants.
Although it is important to ensure that confessions are made with a
free will,' 28 by preventing courts from considering the defendant's
mental state alone, the Connelly Court correctly brought a measure of
objectivity into the test for voluntariness. Prior to Connelly, lower federal
and high state courts had diverged widely on the due process voluntariness issue, due mostly to the ambiguity of the "free will and rational
30
12 9
As was noted in People v. Brown,'
intellect" language in Blackburn.
" '[r]ational intellect and free will,' as a test literally applied, is a far too
metaphysical concept for a court of law."' 3 The Brown court also correctly noted: "Complex moral beliefs and ethical standards may combine with emotional factors to prompt a confession .... Whether such
complex motivations should be considered coercive either alone or in
combination with mental illness may entail value judgments inappropriate for a court to make."' 1 2 It is submitted that courts of law are illequipped to adequately resolve, solely by reference to a subjective definition of "free will," the issues presented in the voluntariness
determination.
By holding that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate for
finding a confession involuntary, the Connelly Court established a degree
of objectivity which will prevent courts in the future from delving into
philosophical and theoretical notions of free will, and also prevent them
from attempting to divine a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting.' 3 3 Courts now must focus not on the defendant's state of mind, but
128. For an incisive and thought-provoking discussion of the role of "free
will" in the area of confessions law, see Grano, supra note 39, at 868-91.
129. For a discussion of the problems created by this language in Blackburn,
see supra note 42. For the two approaches taken by courts in applying the test of

Blackburn, see supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
130. 86 Misc. 2d 339, 380 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1975). For the facts of Brown, see
supra note 52.
131. Id. at 349, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
132. Id. at 350, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88 (citations omitted).
133. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
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on the conduct of the police.' 3 4 However, the defendant's mental condition is still a relevant factor in the voluntariness calculation, because it
bears on the defendant's susceptibility to police coercion.135 While this
focus will not give courts the "bright line" of Miranda, it at least provides an articulable standard to follow when making the voluntariness
determination.'

36

It is further submitted, however, that the Connelly Court did not adequately address the argument that ensuring the reliability of a confession is a due process concern worthy of protection under the fourteenth
amendment. The Court stated that while "[a] statement rendered by
one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable .... this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the
forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
37

Amendment."'
In most cases the reliability of a confession is only an evidentiary
matter. However, when a defendant is convicted solely on the basis of a
confession, the reliability of the confession becomes a matter worthy of
constitutional protection. The potential unfairness of convicting a mentally ill defendant solely on the basis of an inherently unreliable, uncorroborated confession could result in a deprivation of due process, and
38
the Court should have more adequately addressed this argument.'
It is true that most forums adhere to the common law requirement
that to sustain a conviction based on a confession, the confession must
have been corroborated at trial by other evidence. 139 McCormick says
that this requirement is "widely ifnot universally recognized in modern
law and is quite frequently embodied in statutes."' 140 It is submitted
that due process requires that courts universally impose such safeguards
134. See LAw

OF CONFESSIONS,

supra note 2, at § 1:4 (Supp. 1987).

135. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
136. For a general discussion of the desirability of "bright line" rules in
confessions law, see Note, New York v. Quarles: The Dissolution of Miranda, 30
VILL. L. REv. 441, 457-61 (1985).
137. Connellv, 107 S. Ct. at 522 (citation omitted).
138. 107 S. Ct. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 145, at 365. Professor McCormick
recognizes two formulations of the corroboration requirement. One formulation requires that in addition to the confession, the record must contain evidence tending to establish the reliability of the confession. The other
formulation, which has been adopted by the vast majority of American jurisdictions, requires independent proof of the corpus delecti. Id. at 366. Professor
McCormick describes the corpus delecti in the following manner:
To establish guilt in a criminal case, the prosecution must ordinarily
show that (a) the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred;
(b) this injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity; and
(c) the defendant was the guilty party. It is widely accepted that the
corpus delecti consists only of (a) and (b). The corroborating evidence
need not tend to establish that the defendant was the guilty party.
Id. at 366-67 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
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to ensure that mentally ill persons are not deprived of "life, liberty, or
property"' 4 ' by being convicted of serious crimes on the basis of uncorroborated confessions.
The trial court in Connelly made no findings concerning the reliability of Connelly's confession, apparently because none were needed,
since the trial court found the confession inadmissible on involuntariness grounds. 14 2 Justice Brennan stated that the case should be remanded to the trial court to find corroborative evidence, exclusive of
43
Connelly's confession, before admitting the confession into evidence. 1
This seems to be the most fair and logical approach. Since the uncoerced confession of a mentally ill person is now not excludable on the
basis of involuntariness, the potential unreliability of the confession warrants a simple requirement of corroboration or verification before admitting the confession into evidence. 144 "To hold otherwise allows the
ill defendant based
state to imprison and possibly to execute a mentally
1 45
solely upon an inherently unreliable confession."'
This procedure would serve to enhance the integrity of our judicial
system by eliminating the possibility of unfairly convicting a mentally ill
defendant. With a corroboration requirement imposed, the prosecution
would be required to obtain and present evidence independent of the
defendant's confession in order to gain a conviction. By these methods,
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
142. Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he record is barren of any corroboration of the mentally ill defendant's confession. No physical evidence links the defendant to the alleged crime. Police did not identify the alleged victim's body as the
woman named by the defendant. Mr. Connelly identified the alleged
scene of the crime, but it has not been verified that the unidentified
body was found there or that a crime actually occurred there. There is
not a shred of competent evidence in this record linking the defendant
to the charged homicide. There is only Mr. Connelly's confession.

Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. This approach is advocated in 3J. WIGMORE, supra note 22. Professor
Wigmore notes that "[i]f a confession is not coerced or otherwise illegally obtained, the sole criterion of its admissibility may be trustworthiness." Id., § 822
at 336 n.22. An example of this approach noted in WIGMORE is People v.
Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300, 226 N.E.2d 305, 279 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967). That case was not unlike Connelly in that it involved a
defendant who confessed to a crime to a policeman in a public place, with no
prompting. Id. at 303, 226 N.E.2d at 307, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Unlike Connelly,
the defendant was not insane but extremely intoxicated. Id. at 303, 226 N.E.2d
at 306-07, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 517. The court noted: "[W]hen trustworthiness
alone is involved, that is, volitional competency, it is quite relevant to look to
subsequent events to confirm the reliability of the confession." Id. at 305, 226
N.E.2d at 307, 279 N.Y.S.2d 518 (citation omitted). Under the facts of Schompert,
the contents of the defendant's confession and the events following the confession provided a high degree of confirmation, therefore the confession was
deemed admissible. Id. at 307, 226 N.E.2d 309, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
145. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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14 6
the accusatorial nature of our system of justice would be preserved.
Another troubling aspect of Connelly is revealed in the Court's lowering of the standard of proof needed to demonstrate a voluntary Miranda waiver. As Justice Brennan noted, the issue was inappropriately
addressed, because it was not raised by the prosecutor in his petition for
certiorari. 14 7 Furthermore, although the Court claimed to reaffirm the
holding of Lego v. Twomey, in reality the Court transposed the Lego holding from its original voluntariness context to a Miranda waiver
context. 148
This aspect of the Court's holding represents a clear break from
precedent. As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent, Miranda and
other cases have classified the prosecution's burden of proving a valid
waiver of Miranda rights as a "heavy" one. '49 The Connelly majority asserted that this requirement was stated "in passing" in previous
Supreme Court cases. 150 However, the Miranda Court was quite specific
on this subject.' 5 1 In Miranda, the Court made clear that a high burden

146. Justice Brennan stated that the Court's historical distrust of courts relying on confessions to gain convictions is due in part to "their decisive impact
upon the adversarial process." 107 S. Ct. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This
is because triers of fact accord such weight to a confession that it makes the trial

practically superfluous. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Because confessions are so

"profoundly prejudicial," reliance on them lessens to a degree the accusatorial
nature of our judicial process. Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). See Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) ("Under our system society carries the burden of proving
its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its
case, not by interrogation of the accused even underjudicial safeguards, but by
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.").
147. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. A comparison of the holdings of Lego and Connelly reveals the differences. The Lego Court stated:
[W]hen a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against
a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut
determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily rendered. Thus,
the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence
that the confession was voluntary.
Lego, 404 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). Contrast this holding to the language of
Connelly: "We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the State bears the
burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims
was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove waiver only
by a preponderance of the evidence." Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523 (emphasis
added).
149. 107 S. Ct. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Tague v. Louisiana,
444 U.S. 469, 470-71 (1980); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
(1979); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
150. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
151. The Miranda Court stated:
This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the
isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and
has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warn-
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of proof should be placed on the government in proving a valid waiver
of fifth amendment rights. The Connelly Court's imposition of the low
preponderance of the evidence standard contradicts the mandate of
52

Miranda.1

Justice Brennan noted that the Lego decision has been criticized for
not explaining why the preponderance of the evidence standard is more
appropriate than the clear and convincing evidence standard. 15 3 The
Connelly Court makes the same mistake in rejecting the Colorado
Supreme Court's use of the clear and convincing evidence standard.
The Court's analysis of Lego cannot justify the rejection of this intermediate standard, especially since the Lego Court itself stated: "[T]he
States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard
[than the preponderance of the evidence standard]. They may indeed
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at
54
stake."1
IV.

CONCLUSION

The effect that Connelly will have on the rights of criminal defendants remains to be seen. Regarding the due process voluntariness issue,
the unique facts of Connelly will limit the Court's holding, which at first
seems rather broad.
There are likely to be few cases where a defendant voluntarily
presents himself to the police and confesses to a crime without being
questioned. 15 5 In these cases the confession will not be considered involuntary and therefore will be admissible evidence under the Connelly
holding. The reliability of the confession, however, becomes a concern.
If the defendant is not mentally impaired, there will normally be no
ings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly
on its shoulders.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
152. Professor McCormick sets forth a range of burdens of proof and, of
these, preponderance of the evidence is the lowest evidentiary standard. The
higher measures are proof by clear and convincing evidence, which was the standard applied by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d
722, 729 (Colo. 1985), and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, §§ 340-4 1, at 959-64.
Professor McCormick classifies the "preponderance of the evidence" standard as the burden of proof commonly applied in civil trials to prove the existence of a critical fact. Under the preponderance standard, the factfinder must
find that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its non-existence. Id., § 339, at 956-57.
153. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 532 n.7 (Brennan,J., dissenting). For a general
criticism of the decision in Lego, see Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary
Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 276-81 (1975) (article cited by Justice
Brennan in his dissent).
154. Lego, 404 U.S. at 489. 155. In the fifty-year history of the due process voluntariness cases, Connelly
is the first case to reach the Supreme Court where a defendant confessed without any police coercion. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520.
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problem with the reliability of the confession. Presumably, a mentally
aware person would not confess to a crime that she did not commit.
Similarly, even if the defendant is mentally deficient, reliability would
normally not be a concern, because the laws of most if not all the states
require corroboration of the confession. 156 It is submitted that issues of
reliability will rise to the level of constitutional concerns only in the few
cases where police coercion is not present, where the confession is inherently untrustworthy because of mental illness or intoxication and
where the confession is not corroborated with independent evidence. In
cases where the confession of a mentally ill or intoxicated person is obtained in response to non-custodial police questioning, Connelly still
leaves the defendant free to argue that the police activity, in light of the
defendant's mental condition, was coercive and the resulting confession
was thus involuntary and inadmissible.' 5 7 Connelly thus provides some
protection for a defendant whose mental condition makes him susceptible to police coercion if a confession is obtained by police exploiting
that susceptibility. 158
In the Miranda waiver context, Connelly is not likely to have a great
impact on the standards used to determine whether a defendant validly
waived his rights. Although the Connelly Court held that governmental
coercion is necessary to find a waiver involuntary, this has always been
the rule, because the fifth amendment protects against only governmentally compelled self-incrimination. 159 Furthermore, the Court did not
156. For a discussion of the corroboration requirement, see supra notes
139-46 and accompanying text.
157. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. The Court's analysis, however, indicates
that, for the confession to be held involuntary, the defendant may have to show
that the police harbored an improper purpose in obtaining the confession. The
Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 (1963), noted that the absence of
an improper purpose on the part of the questioning officers was irrelevant. The

Townsend Court held that the voluntariness calculation did not depend on
whether the questioning officers knew of the "truth serum" properties of a drug
given to the defendant prior to questioning to alleviate his drug withdrawal
symptoms. Id. at 308-09. However, the Connelly Court specifically described the

police in Townsend as "officers who knew Townsend had been given drugs." Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. Indeed, Connelly referred to Townsend as a case involving
"police wrongdoing." Id. This characterization indicates that the Connelly Court
called into question the motives of the questioning officers in Townsend. By re-

casting the facts of Townsend in this way, the Connelly Court may have been suggesting that improper motives on the part of the questioning police are relevant
to the voluntariness inquiry, although perhaps not determinative.

158. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521. "[M]ental condition is surely relevant to an
individual's susceptibility to police coercion .... " Id.
159. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298. 304-05 (1985) ("The Fifth

Amendment, of course, is not concerned with.., moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion."); Miranda,

384 U.S. at 460 ("[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him
by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from his own mouth.").
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limit the "knowing and intelligent" components of the fifth amendment
waiver requirements, only the "voluntary" component.' 60 A mentally
deficient or intoxicated defendant can still claim that he or she did not
waive his or her fifth amendment rights knowingly or intelligently, even
if a lack of police coercion will not allow the suspect to successfully argue that the waiver was "involuntary."
The Connelly decision could have its greatest impact by lowering the
burden of proof for demonstrating a valid Miranda waiver to a preponderance of the evidence standard. This lower standard will undoubtedly
result in an increased likelihood that a confession obtained without a
voluntary, knowing and intelligent relinquishment of rights will be admitted into evidence.' 6 ' Whether this lower standard will generate an
16 2
increase in the number of such confessions is difficult to predict.
Connelly will likely be viewed by legal scholars as a significant case in
the area of criminal procedure and confessions. Its chief importance is
in clarifying the standards governing inquiry into the voluntariness of
confessions, without significantly diminishing due process protections.
The major problem with this aspect of Connelly is that it may allow unre16 3
liable confessions to be admitted into evidence.
Another criticism of the Connelly decision is that it chips away a little
further at the fifth amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination, which the Miranda Court sought to protect. Whether this process will continue in future years remains to be seen. 164 It is likely,
however, that Connelly represents the beginning of a period of stabilization in the confessions area. The Court's eagerness to decide questions
not necessary to the resolution of the case suggests an effort to "tie up
160. For a discussion of the reason why the Connelly decision will not affect
the "knowing and intelligent" component of the Miranda waiver requirements,
see supra note 105 and accompanying text.

161. See Saltzburg, supra note 153, at 279. The author asserts that "use of
the preponderance standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, increases the likelihood that coerced confessions will be admitted.
Id.
162. But see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 493 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated in his Lego dissent, in the involuntariness context: "Ido not think it can be denied, given the factual nature of the ordinary
voluntariness determination, that permitting a lower standard of proof will necessarily result in the admission of more involuntary confessions than would be
admitted were the prosecution required to meet a higher standard." Lego, 404
U.S. at 493 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's assertion would also apply to a Miranda waiver context, given the factual nature of that determination.
IfJustice Brennan is correct, the lower standard of proof will result in the admission of a greater number of confessions made without a valid waiver.
163. For a discussion of the problems that may arise in the reliability of

confessions under Connelly, see supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the erosion of the Miranda decision, see Note, supra
note 136, at 449-61.
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16 5
the loose ends" of confessions law, at least for the immediate future.
It is unfortunate that the end product of this effort is likely to lead to a
further erosion of constitutional rights.

Michael E. Gehring
165. For a discussion of the unusual way the Court reached out to address
the Miranda issues in Connelly, see supra note 117.
An argument could be made that Connelly effectively eliminates due process
as a separate basis for excluding a confession. The chief utility of a due process
voluntariness argument, in light of Miranda and its progeny, is that it provides an
argument for excluding a confession even if a suspect has not been subject to
custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. For a discussion of the role of
custodial interrogation, see supra note 66. It is difficult to imagine a situation
where a suspect's confession could be the product of police coercion, and thus
involuntary under the fourteenth amendment, without the suspect being subjected to "custodial interrogation" as the term is broadly defined. See W. LAFAVE
&J. ISRAEL, supra, note 66, at §§ 6.6, 6.7. Therefore, a suspect who could prove
a violation of due process because his confession was involuntarily obtained
through official coercion could in all conceivable cases prove that he was subject
to custodial interrogation, bringing the situation within Miranda, and be able to
prove that his Miranda waiver was involuntary.
Further, the Connelly Court now imposes on the government the identical
standards and burdens of proof for proving due process voluntariness and for
proving a valid Miranda waiver. Thus, there is no added advantage to bringing a
due process argument in lieu of, or in addition to, a Miranda argument. In fact,
the due process argument has disadvantages, as under the Miranda doctrine, a
waiver can be proven by showing that it was given unknowingly and unintelligently, thus giving a defendant two additional arguments beyond involuntariness for excluding his confession.
Thus, by making the factual situations for successfully making the two arguments identical, and by eliminating any advantages to making a due process argument, it can be argued that the Court has effectively subsumed the due
process argument into the fifth amendment Miranda argument. In any case, it
seems likely that a court, in deciding whether to exclude a particular confession,
would now reach identical results under either theory.
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